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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In his Appel/ant's Brief, Mr. Clinton argued that the district court abused its 
discretion and acted in manifest disregard of the pertinent provisions of I.C.R. 32 and 
the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522, when it failed to sua sponte order a mental health 
evaluation for Mr. Clinton prior to sentencing. Mr. Clinton alternatively argued that the 
district court imposed and executed an excessive sentence in light of his mental health 
issues. 
In response, the State argued that the fundamental error standard set forth in 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010), overruled prior case law which enabled a 
defendant to claim, for the first time on appeal, that the district court abused its 
discretion when it acted in manifest disregard of a procedural rule at sentencing. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.6-7.) In the alternative, the State argued, in reliance on State v. 
Toohill, 103 Idaho 565 (Ct. App. 1982), that Mr. Clinton cannot claim, for the first time 
on appeal, that the district court's compliance with a procedural rule was inadequate. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.7-8.) The State further argued that I.C. § 19-2522 was not 
applicable because Mr. Clinton's mental health was not a significant factor at 
sentencing, and, if it was, the psychological materials before the court at sentencing met 
the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522. (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-18.) 
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's claim that the Perry 
fundamental error standard overruled the Idaho Court of Appeals' manifest disregard 
standard. Mr. Clinton asserts that a defendant need not object to a district court's 
abuse of discretion at sentencing in order to preserve the issue for appeal. This brief is 
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also necessary to clarify that Mr. Clinton's claim is not based on the district court's 
inadequate adherence to I.C.R. 32 and I.C. § 19-2522, but rather a complete failure to 
adhere to this rule and statute. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Clinton's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion and act in manifest disregard of the 
pertinent provisions of I.C.R. 32 and the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522, when it 
failed to sua sponte order a mental health evaluation of Mr. Clinton prior to 
sentencing?1 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of 
twenty years, with three years fixed, upon Mr. Clinton following his plea of guilty 
to lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen? 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion And Acted In Manifest Disregard Of I.C.R. 32 
And I.C. § 19-2522, When It Failed To Sua Sponte Order A Mental Health Evaluation Of 
Mr. Clinton Prior To Sentencing 
A. Introduction 
The State argues that the Perry opinion overruled the Idaho Court of Appeals' 
manifest disregard standard. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-7.) However, the Perry opinion 
it did not overrule the manifest disregard standard because that standard is not based 
on fundamental error. Alternatively, the Perry opinion was only dealing with trial issues 
and not sentencing issues. Additionally, Mr. Clinton need not object to the district 
court's decision to order a mental health evaluation because that decision is reviewed 
with an abuse of discretion standard. 
The State argues, in the alternative, that even if Perry is not applicable, the 
record before the district court contained enough information to function as a substitute 
of a full I.C. § 19-2522 evaluation. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-S.) For that reason, the 
State asserts, Mr. Clinton's assertion of error merely goes to the adequacy of the district 
court's compliance with I.C. § 19-2522, which cannot be raised for the first time on 
appeal. (Respondent's Brief, p.7.) Contrary to the State's assertion, there never was a 
full diagnosis of Mr. Clinton's dementia, which was the district court's primary focus at 
sentencing. (PSI, pp.15-36.) Therefore, the district court acted in manifest disregard of 
I.C.R 32 and I.C. § 19-2522 when it failed to order a mental health evaluation. 
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B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion And Acted In Manifest Disregard Of 
I.C.R. 32 And I.C. § 19-2522, When It Failed To Sua Sponte Order A Mental 
Health Evaluation Of Mr. Clinton Prior To Sentencing 
1. Perry Did Not Overrule The Manifest Disregard Standard Because That 
Standard Is Not Based On Fundamental Error 
Perry did not overrule did not overrule the Idaho Court of Appeals' manifest 
disregard standard, because the manifest disregard standard is neither based on 
fundamental error nor does it have any relationship to fundamental error. The manifest 
disregard standard was set forth in State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565 (1982). The Toohill 
opinion dealt with the question of whether a district court's failure to order an 
unrequested mental health evaluation, to aid in the creation of a presentence report, 
could be challenged for the first time on appeal. Id. at 566. The Idaho Court of Appeals 
began its analysis with the fundamental error doctrine and stated that it "denotes a 
denial of due process" and "it refers to error which results in failure to afford the accused 
a fair trial." Id. The opinion went on to state that the Idaho Supreme Court has never 
extended '''fundamental error' doctrine beyond the adjudication of guilt, to the 
sentencing process." 2 Id. After these statements where made, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals held: 
We recognize that pre-sentence reports have a significant bearing upon 
sentencing decisions and upon appellate review of sentencing discretion. 
Our Supreme Court has established, by rule, the minimum requirements 
for pre-sentence reports. See I.C.R. 32(b) and its predecessor, I.C.R. 37, 
which applies to this case. The rule is there to be followed. Manifest 
disregard of the rule could not be countenanced on appeal without 
diminishing the reputation of the judicial process. Therefore, we believe 
2 The Idaho Supreme Court has since applied fundamental error to sentencing issues. 
See State v. Longest, 149 Idaho 782 (2010) (see also State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71 
(2005)) (State v. Robbins, 123 Idaho 527 (1993)). 
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that a case characterized by such disregard of the rule may be reviewed, 
despite lack of objection below, in order to protect the integrity of the 
courts. 
Id. The Idaho Court of Appeals did not base its manifest disregard standard on 
fundamental error or due process, as it was described by the Idaho Supreme Court at 
that time. Id. Instead, the Court of Appeals based this standard on the importance of 
trial courts' adherence to procedural rules when exercising their sentencing discretion. 
Id. In other words, the manifest disregard standard is distinct and independent from the 
fundamental error doctrine. So, even if Perry altered the fundamental error standard 
outside of a trial, it did not alter the manifest disregard standard because that doctrine is 
based on appellate review of abuse of discretion at sentencing and the requirements 
that trial courts adhere to procedural rules. 
The manifest disregard standard is not derived from fundamental error because 
Idaho trial courts have an independent and statutorily directed duty to order mental 
health evaluations pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522. In State v. Hanson, Opinion 42 (Idaho 
January 06, 2012), (Court opinion is not yet final pursuant to I.A.R. 38(b)),3 the Idaho 
Supreme Court reaffirmed the mandatory and independent duty of trail courts to order 
mental health evaluations pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522.4 The Idaho Supreme Court noted 
that the decision to order a mental health evaluation is generally discretionary. Id. at 4. 
However, that discretion is statutorily curtailed because the language of I.C. § 19-2522 
3 Mr. Clinton recognizes that this case was released after the State filed its 
Respondent's Brief. 
4 Hanson is distinguishable from this matter because the defendant in Hanson did 
request a mental health evaluation. Despite that difference, the Hanson opinion 
provides helpful guidance in determining the nature of a district court's duty pursuant to 
I.C. § 19-2522. 
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"clearly indicates that a psychological evaluation is mandatory . . . when 'there is a 
reason to believe the mental condition of the defendant will be a significant factor at 
sentencing and for good cause shown the court shall appoint at least (1) psychiatrist or 
licensed psychologist to examine and report upon the mental condition of the 
defendant.'" Id. at 4-5. (quoting I.C. § 19-2522) (original emphasis). The court 
recognizes that I.C. § 19-2522 requires the trial court to order a mental health 
evaluation, regardless of whether defense counsel requests one.5 
In sum, the manifest disregard standard, which is derived from statutory duty, 
bears no relationship to fundamental error, which is derived from constitutional 
guarantees of due process. 
2. The Perry Standard Is Applicable To Trials And Did Not Supplant The 
Idaho Court Of Appeals' Manifest Disregard Standard Which Is Applicable 
At Sentencing 
The State asserts that the Idaho Supreme Court overruled the Idaho Court of 
Appeals' manifest disregard standard in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.6-7.) The State's position is without merit because Perry only 
addressed trial error. In Perry, the Idaho Supreme Court set forth a single standard to 
govern prosecutorial misconduct and the harmless error, which are rules that are only 
5 This point is repeated in the Hanson opinion. ("[We] hold that when the record shows 
a defendant has a substantial history of serious mental illness, the defendant's mental 
condition will be a significant factor in determining an appropriate sentence and 
I.C. § 19-2522 requires the sentencing court to obtain a psychological evaluation prior to 
sentencing." Hanson, at 6.)( "[TJhe district court did not order an evaluation prior to 
sentencing, but did order one after sentencing .... " Id. (citing to State v. Banbury, 145 
Idaho 265 (Ct. App. 2007) (emphasis added» ("[T]he sentencing court should have 
ordered an evaluation before imposing sentence .... " Id. at 6-7. (citing to State v. 
McFarland, 125 Idaho 876 (Ct. App. 1994». 
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applicable at trial. Perry, 150 Idaho at 219. 6 This point is consistent with the fact that 
the language in the Perry opinion only references trial error and does not address 
sentencing error. Even the State's citation to Perry refers to error, which occurs at trial. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.6. ("[W]here an error has occurred at trial and was not followed 
by a contemporaneous objection ... " Perry, 150 Idaho at 226) (emphasis added.)) 
The Perry opinion addressed a policy against tactically omitting an objection or 
"sandbagging," which is not a concern at sentencing in the specific context of the district 
court's failure to order a mental health examination because participation in that exam is 
not mandatory. The Perry opinion stated that "requiring a contemporaneous objection 
prevents the litigant from sandbagging the court, i.e., 'remaining silent about his 
objection and belatedly raiSing the error only if the case does not conclude in his favor.'" 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 224. (citations omitted). In Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558 (2006), 
the Idaho Supreme Court noted that a defendant's participation with the presentence 
report ordered pursuant to I.C.R. 32 is not mandatory and the defendant can refuse to 
participate in the report. Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562. While the district court has a duty 
pursuant to I.C.R. 32 and I.C. § 19-2522 to order a mental health evaluation at 
sentencing when mental health is a significant sentencing factor, the defendant can 
refuse to participate with that evaluation as per Estrada. In the event the district court 
fulfills its duty to order a mental health evaluation, and a defendant refuses to participate 
in that evaluation, the doctrines of waiver and invited error will presumable preclude the 
defendant from obtaining appellate relief on that issue. 
6 The Idaho Supreme Court also disavowed its prior definition of fundamental error 
which was set forth in Smith v. State, 94 Idaho 469 (1971), for reasons which are 
unrelated to the matter at hand. Id. at 226-227. 
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In sum, the Perry opinion was only altered fundamental error as it applies to trials 
because it was addressing trial issues. 
3. The District Court's Failure To Order A Mental Health Evaluation Can Be 
Raised For The First Time On Appeal Because That Decision Is Reviewed 
Under An Abuse Of Discretion Standard 
It is weI/-established that the standard that this Court applies to review a 
sentence on appeal is an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 
378, 384 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 74-75 (Ct. App. 2005). The 
three-part test for an abuse of discretion is equally wel/-established-this Court will 
review the district court's sentencing determination for: (1) whether the district court 
correctly recognized the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within 
the proper boundaries of that discretion and consistently with the legal standards that 
are applicable to the district court's discretionary determination; and (3) whether the 
district court reached its decision through the exercise of reason. Id. In this case, the 
district court acted in violation of the applicable legal standards attendant to its 
discretion at sentencing when the court failed to order a mental health evaluation 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522. There are many discretionary decisions made by Idaho trial 
courts, which are routinely reviewed by Idaho appel/ate courts under an abuse of 
discretion standard that does not require objections. For example, defense counsel is 
not required to immediately object after the imposition of a sentence to preserve an 
excessive sentencing claim for appellate review. 
Further, from a perspective of judicial economy, allowing unobjected to error to 
be raised for the first time on appeal is less expensive and time consuming than 
aI/owing unobjected error at trial to be raised in the same manner. "[U]nobjected to 
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errors that occur at trial precipitates an entire new trial that could have been avoided by 
a timely objection, whereas correcting a sentencing error results in, at most, only a 
remand for resentencing, or, as in this case, for a modification of the allegedly 
erroneous condition of supervised release." U.S. v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 125 (2nd. 
Cir. 2002). Had Mr. Clinton requested a psychological evaluation at sentencing, the 
district court would have had to continue the hearing, which would have caused the 
expenditure of a substantially similar amount of judicial resources as the remedy 
requested pursuant to this appeal: to wit, a psychological evaluation preformed by the 
licensed psychologist or psychiatrist and another sentencing hearing. 
In sum, Perry did not overrule the manifest disregard standard because it is 
based on the district court's independent duty to order a mental health evaluation 
pursuant to I.C.R. 32 and I.C § 19-2522, and is not based on due process and the 
fundamental error standard. Alternatively, the Perry opinion was limited to trial 
proceedings and not sentencing. Additionally, because the failure to order a mental 
health evaluation is reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard, defendants do not 
have to object to allege that discretion was abused. 
4. Mr. Clinton Can Demonstrate Fundamental Error 
If it is determined that Perry overruled the manifest disregard standard, 
Mr. Clinton argues, in the alternative, that he can demonstrate fundamental error. In 
order to make a showing of fundamental error, the defendant must demonstrate: (1) 
that the error was of constitutional magnitude - i.e. that one or more of the defendant's 
un-waived constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the error was plain on the face of 
the record and that the failure to object was not the product of a tactical decision; and 
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(3) that the error was prejudicial, which requires the defendant to show a reasonable 
possibility that the error contributed to the outcome of the proceedings. Perry, 150 
Idaho at 226. 
Mr. Clinton submits that he met this standard. Even though Mr. Clinton argues 
that manifest disregard standard was not based on due process, an independent due 
process violation can be found when a district court fails to adhere to the procedural 
rules and statutory mandates. The district court violated Mr. Clinton's constitutionally 
protected due process rights did not adhere to its statutorily mandated duty to order a 
mental health evaluation. See section I(B)(1), supra. In light of Hanson and Estrada, 
supra, this error was clear and there is not risk of sandbagging. See section I(B)(1) and 
1 (B)(3), supra. Additionally, Mr. Clinton was prejudiced because he lost the benefit of 
his plea bargain, i.e., an order placing him on probation. (Appel/ant's Brief, pp.11-12.) 
Further, the district court increased the length of the indeterminate portion of 
Mr. Clinton's sentence because it did not have enough information about Mr. Clinton's 
treatment options. See Section 1(0) infra. 
C. The District Court Did Not Substantially Comply With I.C. § 19-2522 When 
It Relied On Mr. Clinton's Competency Evaluations, Psychosexual Evaluation, 
And The Presentence Report 
The State asserts that the district court had an adequate record of Mr. Clinton's 
mental health prior to sentencing, and for that reason the manifest disregard standard is 
not applicable because a claim that adequacy of compliance with I.C.R. 32 cannot be 
raised for the first time on appeal. (Respondent's Brief, p.?) In support of this position 
the State cited to ToohiIJ, supra. The portion of the Toohill opinion relied on by the State 
is as follows: 
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However, we will not review a contention, made for the first time on 
appeal, that compliance with the rule was simply inadequate-e.g., that the 
report should have developed a particular point further, or that certain 
information was incomplete or inaccurate. Those are matters to be raised 
at the sentencing hearing. 
Toohill, 103, Idaho at 566-567. 
Contrary to the State's assertion, the fact that the PSI addressed Mr. Clinton's 
mental health, does not overcome the district court's failure to order a mental health 
evaluation. (Respondent's Brief, p.10-11.) The Idaho Supreme Court recently 
addressed this issue in Hanson, supra. In that case, the defendant refused to 
participate in the presentence report but requested a mental health evaluation. Hanson 
at 8. The State argued that the general waiver rule precluded the defendant from 
selectively invoking his 5th Amendment privilege against self incrimination in regards to 
the same subject matter. Id. at 8-9. In rejecting this argument, the Idaho Supreme 
Court first noted that there are "topics in common to both a PSI and psychological 
evaluation." Id. at 9. The Supreme Court then stated that the Presentence 
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) provides a general and "cursory" background of 
the defendant from information available in the public records, while a psychological 
evaluation provides "in-depth analysis" performed by a psychiatrist or a licensed 
psychologist and has specific requirements that are "focused directly and exclusively on 
the defendant's [psychological] background." Id. at 9-10. In light of the foregoing, the 
State's argument that the PSI adequately addressed Mr. Clinton's mental health is 
without merit because the PSI does not satisfy the "focused" requirements of an 
I.C. § 19-2522 mental health evaluation. (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-11.) 
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The State also argued that the two competency evaluations were a sufficient 
substitute for an I.C. § 19-2522 psychological evaluation. (Respondent's Brief, pp.11-
13.) Contrary to the State's assertion, Mr. Clinton's competency evaluations were not a 
sufficient substitute for a full psychological examination because they did not address 
potential treatment options. One of the primary purposes of an I.C. § 19-2522 mental 
health evaluation is to "assist" the district court when deciding whether to recommend 
psychological treatment while the defendant is incarcerated, and competency 
evaluations generally do not consider the factors set forth in I.C. § 19-2522. Hanson, at 
10-11; (See a/so State v. Banbury, 145 Idaho 265, (Ct. App. 2007) "[P]sychological 
evaluations to determine a defendant's competence to stand trial or aid in his defense 
conducted pursuant to I.C. § 18-211 often will be insufficient to inform the court's 
sentencing decision because they will not address the factors delineated in I.C. § 19-
2522(3)."). As argued in the Appellant's Brief, the first competency evaluation stated 
that Mr. Clinton needed a comprehensive neurological evaluation, which may assist in 
treatment options to improve his cognitive functioning, and the second evaluation never 
ruled out dementia. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-11.) Therefore, the competency evaluations 
are not an adequate substitute for an I.C. § 19-2522 evaluation because they did not 
address treatment related issues and never fully diagnosed Mr. Clinton's possible 
dementia. 
The psychosexual evaluation cannot function as a substitute for an I.C. § 19-
2522 evaluation because it never provided further insight into Mr. Clinton's possible 
dementia. (PSI, pp.15-36.) The psychosexual evaluation suffered from the same 
deficiency as the competency evaluations because it relied on those evaluations and 
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never indicated that it performed the comprehensive neurological examination deemed 
necessary in the competency evaluations. (PSI, pp.19-20.) While the psychosexual 
evaluator did perform his own mental health examination, which focused on 
Mr. Clinton's clinical mood issues, substance addiction, and his personality disorders, 
the evaluator did not indicate that any comprehensive testing for neurological disorders 
were performed. (PSI, p.25.) According to the State, "[d]uring the psychosexual 
evaluation, Dr. Johnson administered three psychological tests in addition to the 16 
previous psychological test performed by Dr. Beaver, but the new tests did not produce 
valid results due to 'what appeared to be low intellectual functioning.'" (Respondent's 
Brief, pp.13-14 (citing to PSI, p.24.)) The psychosexual evaluation did not shed any 
new light on Mr. Clinton's mental health. In fact, it only raised more questions about 
Mr. Clinton's cognitive functioning. 
In sum, the record before the district court did not function as an adequate 
substitute for a fulll.C. § 19-2522 mental health evaluation. For that reason, the district 
court acted in manifest disregard of I.C.R. 32 and I.C. §19-2522 when it failed to order a 
mental health evaluation prior to sentencing. 
D. Mr. Clinton's Mental Health Was A Significant Factor At Sentencing 
The State argues that Mr. Clinton must establish a nexus between his mental 
health and the commission of the underlying offense, in order for his mental health to be 
considered as a significant factor at sentencing. Specifically, the State argued: 
The specific extent of [Mr. Clinton's] dementia was not a 'significant factor 
at sentencing' because it was not a 'key underlying factor in the 
defendant's commission of the crime.'" State v. Shultz, 149 Idaho 285, 
288 (Ct. App. 2010) (Stating that "[a]lthough not exclusive, a defendant's 
mental condition can be a significant factor at sentencing when that 
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condition may be a key factor in the defendant's commission of the crime, 
especially when the actions are a serious departure from the defendant's 
history and character."}. The crime at issue here is not a departure from 
[Mr. Clinton's] history or character in any way. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.15.) While Mr. Clinton does not contest the standard proffered 
by the State, this is not an exclusive standard. 
Hanson, supra, clarified what is necessary to establish that mental health is a 
significant factor at sentencing. In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court held that "when 
the record shows a defendant has a substantial history of serious mental illness, the 
defendant's mental condition will be a significant factor in determining an appropriate 
sentence and I.C. § 19-2522 requires the sentencing court to obtain a psychological 
evaluation prior to sentencing." Hanson, at 6. The Idaho Supreme Court went on to 
hold that the district court's comments about a defendant's need for psychological 
treatment can be considered in this analysis. Id. 6-7. In this case, the district court 
made the following statements pertaining to Mr. Clinton's mental health and potential 
treatment: 
It is not clear if treatment can be successful, based on his deteriorating 
condition. 
Historically, what happened to elderly defendants in a situation like this is 
that they were sent to Orofino, where there is some treatment available, 
and where they are kept away from younger inmates who might present a 
risk to them, but they are also kept away from any access to children, and 
it's probably something like that that would be beneficial in this case. 
There is limited sexual offender treatment in the institution. It's 
really ... up in the air about whether that would be successful, I think the 
court does need to consider the State's recommendation for a longer tail. 
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(Tr., p.51, L.25 - p.53, L.3.) Even the length of Mr. Clinton's sentence was partially 
based on the district court's assertions about the nexus between Mr. Clinton's mental 
health and the affect it has on his amenability to treatment. The district court went on to 
state: 
[H]e already had treatment, so I do not think in the sense of a willingness 
to participate in treatment [sic], he has demonstrated that in the past, but 
with the processes that are going on inside him now, it's not clear if he can 
benefit from it in the future. 
(Tr., p.53, Ls.11-17.) The district court stated that it was unsure about the type of 
treatment Mr. Clinton needed and that this lack of clarity was caused by Mr. Clinton's 
deteriorating mental health. The district court lengthened the indeterminate portion of 
Mr. Clinton's sentence based on this confusion, which could have been reduced had it 
ordered a fulll.C. § 19-2522 evaluation. 
Additionally, the State argues that there is no nexus between Mr. Clinton's 
mental health and the commission of the offense because "[t]he crime at issue here is 
not a departure from [Mr. Clinton's] history or character in any way." (Respondent's 
Brief, p.15.) Contrary to this assertion, Mr. Clinton's mental health issues did contribute 
to his commission of the offense. The State accurately pointed out that Mr. Clinton had 
previously been convicted for a similar offense. (Respondent's Brief, p.15.) However, 
the State failed to mention that this conviction occurred, approximately 25 years ago, in 
1986 and is the only other criminal conviction on Mr. Clinton's record. (PSI, pp.4-5.) 
Concerning this point, the district court stated that Mr. Clinton's prior treatment, "was 
successful for awhile." (Tr., p.47, L.22 - p.5D, L.5D.) The Court went on to state that: 
[W]hat we have right now is a very serious issue that the defendant is 
suffering from dementia, which will probably worsen his ability to 
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understand and internalize additional counseling. If the prior counseling 
was successful ... that success appears to be dimming now. 
(Tr., p.51, Ls.11-17.) 
I'm afraid that what's going on for whatever reason appears to be 
lessening his ability to control his impulses. 
(Tr., p.52, L.13-16.) 
Unfortunately, sexual impulses tend to survive dementia. They tend to be 
whatever they were before the dementia process began, so I think, 
unfortunately, the risk in this case is quite high, and the practical solutions 
are non-existent. 
(Tr., p.53, Ls.18-23/ According to the district court, Mr. Clinton was willing to 
participate in treatment in the past and this treatment was successful. The district court 
went on to state that Mr. Clinton's lack of compliance with his prior treatment was out of 
his control and caused by his dementia. Therefore, the district court concluded that 
Mr. Clinton's dementia was causally related to the commission of the underlying 
offense. 
In sum, Mr. Clinton mental illness is so severe it was the district court's major 
focus at sentencing and the reason he was not placed on probation, which was the 
benefit his attorney negotiated for him during the plea process. Therefore, and under 
the standards set forth in Hanson and Shultz, Mr. Clinton's mental health was a 
significant factor at sentencing. 
7 In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Clinton does challenge some of the district court's 
statements as being clearly erroneous because they are the type which require an 
expert opinion. (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-15.) 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Clinton respectfully requests that his sentence be vacated and that this case 
be remanded to the district court with instructions to order a mental health evaluation 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522. Alternatively, Mr. Clinton respectfully requests that this 
Court remand this case with instructions for the district court to either place Mr. Clinton 
on probation with terms it deems appropriate or place him on a period of retained 
jurisdiction. 
DATED this 25th day of January, 2012. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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